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Abstract (English) 
Among the many factors governing migration, education plays a major role, though more in 
the long run than for short-term floods particularly of irregular migration. Concerning the long 
run effects, the direction of causation and the slope of the connection are debated in 
theory. Education not only determines the mobility of people, it also is positively correlated 
with rising incomes. Empirical evidence shows that for people in developing countries, who 
are at the low end of the income distribution, more education and rising income levels are 
push factors for emigration. However, beyond a certain threshold further rising incomes tend 
to retard migration. As a result, education exhibits an inverted-U shaped relationship with 
migration. Another remarkable fact is that, on average, people who migrate are better 
educated than non-migrants back home as well as indigenous people in the host country.  
Abstract (deutsch) 
Unter den vielen Faktoren, die auf die Migration wirken, spielt die Bildung eine wichtige Rolle, 
wenn auch eher langfristig als für kurzfristig ausgelöste Wanderungsschübe, insbesondere bei 
irregulärer Migration. Der langfristige Zusammenhang ist aber theoretisch weder hinsichtlich 
der Kausalitätsrichtung noch auch der Neigung eindeutig. Ein Mehr an Bildung erhöht nicht 
nur die Mobilität der Bevölkerung, es lässt auch höhere Einkommen erwarten. Empirische 
Untersuchungen an Personen in Entwicklungsländern, die sich am unteren Ende der 
Einkommensverteilung befinden, zeigen, dass Bildung und Einkommen als Push-Faktoren auf 
die Emigration wirken. Wird jedoch eine bestimmte Einkommensschwelle überschritten, 
hemmen noch mehr Einkommen die Emigration, woraus sich ein Gesamtzusammenhang in 
Form eines umgedrehten U ergibt. Bemerkenswert ist ferner, dass Migranten im Durchschnitt 
nicht nur besser ausgebildet sind als ihre zurückbleibenden Landsleute, sondern auch im 
Vergleich zur angestammten Bevölkerung im Zielland. 
 
1. Introduction 
The following overview will link the phenomenon of migration waves to differences in living 
conditions in source and target countries, covering existing income and wealth gaps as well 
as grossly differing conditions of political stability and environmental security, the latter 
resulting in forced (“irregular”) migration. Political instability may take the form of all-
embracing civil wars or just be limited to tribal or personal repression. Substantial income 
differences can result from diverse endowments with natural resources and other factors of 
production and/or the efficiency of their use. The efficiency itself can be linked to domestic 
and imported technologies as well as to the education and training systems. Thus, the 
amount and structure of migration depend, among many other factors, upon education. 
However, there is still some debate on the slope (positive or negative) of the relation, and 
even on the direction of causation. In neoclassical models with long run results, more 
education (and rising incomes) in the country of origin are usually seen as retarding 
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emigration, while in less restrictive models and for shorter periods (of a decade or so) more 
education may empower people to leave their country temporarily or permanently. 
The subsequent chapters are devoted to, in turn, the possible sources of mass migration 
including international income differences, the impact of education on living standards and 
migration, and the effects of migration on source countries and host countries. 
 
2. Origins of migration waves 
“Migrants are essentially escaping from countries with dysfunctional social models” which 
may be defined as “the combination of institutions, rules, norms, and organizations” (Collier 
2013: 33f). The basic preconditions for migration are labour mobility and diverse economic 
and social developments within and between countries. As a global trend emigration from 
developing countries has been propelled particularly by educated people, resulting in “brain 
drain” for these areas and corresponding “brain gain” for the receiving industrialized 
countries (Barrientos 2007). More generally, there are processes of economic development 
and social transformation which further the capabilities and aspirations of people to migrate 
from low-income countries to the more developed world, assisted by reduced transport and 
communication costs (Flahaux – de Haas 2016). The general empirical observation that 
desired migration from poor countries is much higher than from rich countries has been 
complemented by Pelham – Torres (2008) who conclude from a Gallup Poll that at each 
income level it is generally the richer individuals who are more inclined to migrate. 
In the receiving countries, the driver of temporary migration (disregarding refugees) is the 
existence of dual labor markets and the differing working attitudes of natives and immigrants 
(Piore 1986, 2013). Natives resist to work in the low-paid secondary market, also because of its 
menial social status and considerable employment instability. In contrast, for temporary 
immigrants wages in that market are usually high compared with income choices back 
home, and they also care less about their social status as this is anyway defined in their home 
country. Piore explores the development from temporary migration (which satisfies the labor 
market requirements of the sending as well as the receiving country) to permanent 
settlement which creates a number of follow-up problems, again in either country. In 
particular, as soon as the secondary jobs become permanent, the immigrants and their kids 
demand incomes and social status equivalent to their native neighbors. 
More generally, Schmid (2018) lists possible differences in life chances and their associated 
pull and push factors that are responsible for migration (see Table 1). 
We are not talking here primarily about sporadic migration or scattered refugees, but rather 
about systematic exodus from countries characterized by extremely low income per capita 
levels.1 And we are also not directly concerned here with political disruption resulting from 
war, poverty, underemployment and environmental disasters, as their causes and their 
effects on refugees and emigrants are well beyond pure economic reasoning. The impact of 
political turmoil differs from case to case in a way that precludes general conclusions and 
policy lessons. We will focus on migration resulting from international income differences and 
on education as a source of such differences. 
 
                                                          
1  Sporadic migration is often confined to movement of persons within countries, the analytics of which 
are covered by various theories, including the concepts of costs and returns (Rabianski 1971). 
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Table 1: Migration potential due to regional differences in life chances 
 
Source: Schmid (2018) 
 
Over much of the 19th century, global income inequalities (measured with the Theil entropy 
index) were driven by differences within countries according to social classes. This has 
dramatically changed, as currently some 70-80% can be explained by differences among 
countries (Milanovic, 2016: 128f). Following Collier (2013), the income gap between the 
developing and developed world is likely to remain wide enough for several decades to 
carry a strong incentive for continuing migration fluxes. Just to give an idea of the numbers 
involved, Myers (2005) estimates that up to 2050 as many as 200 million people may flee their 
residence just as a consequence of environmental disasters (e.g. droughts, rising sea level, 
tidal waves).  
The basic causal relationships governing the incentives for migration have nicely been 
summarized by Hsieh – Klenow (2010) as depicted in Figure 1: Given the sheer possibility to 
change residence (information, costs), current and prospective political (in)stability and 
international income differences provide the essential channels for an individual’s decision to 
move abroad. 
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Figure 1: Stylized sources of migration 
 
Source: Based on Hsieh – Klenow (2010) 
 
Early theoretical arguments concerning the influence of living standards on the migration rate 
have concentrated on neoclassical models which generally arrive at the conclusion that with 
increasing income levels at home the propensity to migrate should fall. The reason for such a 
negative relationship is that migration is considered a costly move to improve one’s living 
conditions, a form of investment in human capital. More recent theories have extended this 
model to include a number of additional explanatory factors, resulting in the inverted U-
shaped form of “mobility transition” (Zelinsky 1971) which suggests that emigration from poor 
countries first increases before decreasing with economic development. Clemens (2014) has 
presented a list of possible extensions to the narrow neoclassical model: 
 Demographic transition: Rising incomes can induce demographic changes (less child 
mortality at given fertility rates causing unemployment to rise) that favor emigration. 
 Credit constraints: Rising incomes help potential migrants finance the costs of mobility. 
 Information asymmetry: Emigrated people provide information to potential new 
migrants. 
 Structural change and worker dislocation: In the course of economic development 
new sectors rise and old sectors decline, thus spurring geographic mobility. 
 Inequality: Economic development can be associated with changes in income 
distribution that affect the demand for migration. 
 Immigration barriers abroad: Destination countries usually have visa classes that are 
more easily available to high-income workers. 
In his empirical investigation of the relationship between income per capita and emigration 
from developing countries, Clemens (2014) finds that macro studies (aggregate flows out of 
some broad geographic area such as a nation, province, or state) based on cross-sectional 
data generally reveal either a positive or an inverted-U relationship, while time-series studies 
do not display any consistent correlation. The latter result may be due to the rather limited 
time span of time series studies (“only” some 15 to 25 years) and the countervailing effects of 
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a positive association in the long run and negative effects in the short run when people in a 
temporary crisis massively flee their region. Studies at the micro level (workers, households, 
villages) also find positive and inverted U-shaped relationships, but the results are 
heterogeneous depending on additional explanatory variables such as credit and 
information constraints. The empirical visibility of the inverted-U when migration stocks 
(measured as total number of people born in a specific country, but residing outside that 
country, divided by that country’s population) are seen as a function of real income per 
capita (at Purchasing Power Parity). Employing data collected by the World Bank (1960-2000) 
and the UN (1990-2010), the relationship is positive for the range of income per capita from 
roughly $600 (e.g. Afghanistan) to $7,500 (e.g. Morokko), i.e. rising income levels go hand in 
hand with rising emigration stocks. At higher income levels, labeled by the World Bank as 
“upper-middle-income countries” or “high income countries” (with an income per capita of 
more than some $7,500), the relationship turns clearly negative (Figure 2). 
Clemens (2014) then undertakes the important exercise to project the time span required for 
a developing country to reach a certain income level, given a reasonable estimate of the 
average rate of economic growth. Assuming an optimistic annual rate of growth of 3%, the 
path from an income per capita level2 of $500 (e.g. Ethiopia) to $7,000 (e.g. South Africa) 
would take 89 years, starting from $2,000 (e.g. Moldovia) it would still be 42 years. A general 
conclusion of these observations would be that “the migration transition is a process of 
generations” (p.9). 
 
Figure 2: Emigrant stocks in cross section, UN data 
 
Source: Clemens (2014) 
                                                          
2  In 2016, at constant 2010 US$, see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD 
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Dao et al. (2018) confirm the general (short to medium term) perception that migration 
increases with development, underpinning it with the increasing proportion of college 
graduates in the native population which is the group that has the highest propensity to 
emigrate abroad. (Figure 3). 
To summarize, migration waves result from political, social and economic gaps within as well 
as between countries. Of utmost importance are unpromising developments in living 
conditions. The combined push and pull factors generate migration flows of educated and 
mobile people from lower income to higher income countries, and the flows are likely to 
continue well into the future. Empirical studies for developing countries have shown that the 
relationship between income per capita and emigration is either positive or of an inverted-U 
form: Migration increases with income up to a certain threshold, but decreases thereafter. 
 
Figure 3: Non-parametric regressions of emigration rates on income per capita 
 
Note: The sample includes 123 countries with populations above 2.5 million. Average migration rates are 
calculated as the difference between migrant stocks in 2000 and 2010, normalized by the population at 
origin. 
Source: Dao et al. (2018). 
 
3. The role of human capital in international income differences   
The inputs into the income-generating production process and their development may be 
linked to a number of background factors, such as the geographical location, climate 
changes, the history of political institutions and the rule of law, culture and religion, and the 
role of corruption. These in turn are often – and independent of the income situation – 
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responsible for the political stability of a country. But there exists a feedback loop between 
income (the level, growth and distribution of income) and political stability. Political turmoil 
may exert a lasting negative impact on income developments, and a lack of fair income 
and wealth distribution may provoke civil wars. 
When it comes to quantitative evaluation of international income differences, one has to 
start from the process of generating national income which depends (i) on production factor 
endowments, such as natural resources (e.g. oil, gold, diamonds etc.), physical capital and 
investments to increase the capital stock, and the labour force; and (ii) on the efficiency 
which the production factors are used with (also called total factor productivity, TFP, or 
“Solow residual”); TFP is an outgrowth particularly of technological progress via research and 
innovation as well as education and training (see e.g. Weyerstraß 2018).  
For investigating international income differences, a method often relied upon is 
Development Accounting (DA) which measures the relative contribution of physical capital, 
human capital, and TFP in accounting for cross-country income differences (Jones 2015, 
Hendricks – Schoellman 2017). More concretely, DA can be employed to estimate, for a 
given point in time, the percentage contributions of explanatory variables to international 
differences of income per capita in various countries. In the words of Caselli (2005), DA “does 
for the cross-section what growth accounting does in the time series”.3 For exercises 
employing DA, factors resembling the production factors are usually known, while the residual 
TFP as “some sort of measure of our ignorance” (Abramovitz 1956) is unknown. This is a pity, as 
observed differences in the factors employed in production (capital, labor) account only for 
a small fraction of international income differences (Cuñat – Zymek 2017a,b). Therefore, 
much of the literature on DA is concerned with exploring ways to reduce the importance of 
the residual, e.g. by experimenting with functional forms or improving the definition and 
measurement of incomes and production factors, in particular with respect to human capital 
as the combination of employed persons (or hours) and qualities attached (such as years of 
education). The functional forms employed in their simplest form imply that technology 
differences across countries are skill-neutral, and workers with different skills are perfect 
substitutes. 
Human capital may be defined as the number of persons employed or as working hours 
provided or as the weighted labor force according to the level of schooling and training 
attained. In each case, the residual TFP will be of different value. If known quality aspects 
(such as weighted average schooling) are encompassed in the labour term of the 
production function (productivity-adjusted labour or “human capital” (Cuñat – Zymek, 
2017a), the residual TFP will not be bloated by this element of education.  
Hsieh – Klenow (2010) report the following average contributions to international income 
differences: human capital accounting for some 10-30%, physical capital for about 20% and 
the residual TFP for some 50-70%. However, in their own analysis the authors point at the 
shortcomings of this method, in particular stemming from the definition of capital and labour 
                                                          
3  Either case may conveniently be derived from some form of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
which in log-terms has the form lnY = lnA + lnK + (1-)lnL, where Y is total real output, K is the capital 
stock, L is the labour force, and the residual A is total factor productivity.  is the production elasticity 
of capital, which (based on empirical labour shares) is often assumed at about one third (Caselli, 
2005). For international comparison, Y, K and L are typically expressed in per capita terms. Caselli 
(2005) experiments with CES production functions to relax the implicit assumption of the Cobb-Douglas 
function that TFP elasticity is neutral with respect to labour and capital. Other models are discussed, 
e.g., in Hsieh – Klenow (2010). 
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and the likely interdependences between changes of physical and human capital on the 
one hand and TFP on the other.  
Empirical assessments of the contribution of human capital to international income 
differences are rather diverse, ranging from one-fifth (Hall – Jones 1999) to four-fifth (Jones 
2014). Hendricks – Schoellman (2017) derive their estimates from the wage gains of US 
immigrants before and after migration. Accounting for elasticities of substitution between 
skilled and unskilled labor, they estimate the share of human capital at some 60%. Using 
foreign trade statistics to distinguish between skilled and unskilled labor, Malmberg (2017) 
estimates a human capital share of 65%. However, he also discusses the grey zone between 
the quality of human capital and factor-augmenting technologies, as they have the same 
implications for quantity and price data in foreign trade. “Intuitively, price and quantity data 
alone cannot tell whether a worker is good at hammering, or has a good hammer.” 
Large contributions of TFP could also be the result of omitting other known influences on the 
development of international income differences, such as trade links with other countries 
(Cuñat – Zymek 2017a, b). By introducing relative factor costs, the contribution of TFP to 
explain per-capita income differences could almost be halved. Figure 4 provides an 
impression of the impact on TFP (measured as national TFP relative to US TFP) of switching 
from using only domestic production factors to explain countries’ incomes (grey bars) to an 
open-economy model (black bars). The implied differences of relative TFP between countries 
are considerably smaller in the latter case. E.g. the relatively high per-worker GDP in 
Luxembourg can partly be attributed to high factor costs, and the relatively low per-worker 
GDP in Bulgaria to relatively low factor costs. Without the relative-factor-cost term, 
Luxembourg’s TFP would be overstated and Bulgaria’s understated.  
Apart from income differences between nations, migration can also be influenced by 
income distribution. As average incomes rise in developing countries, for some relatively 
deprived groups the tension may increase to search somewhere else for better living 
conditions. Empirical investigations of inequality in the context of migration show a positive 
association between the origin-country Gini coefficient and emigration. This means that 
countries with higher income inequality are likely to generate a larger share of international 
migrants (Adams – Page 2003).However, in the current context it is also worth mentioning that 
the positive association between globalization and inequality appears to get smaller the 
more countries spend on education (Lang – Mendes Tavares 2018). 
In summary, Development Accounting has been employed to measure the relative 
contribution of human capital to international income differences. Empirical results vary 
according to the type of production function employed, the specific definition of human 
capital and assumptions about the substitutability of skilled and unskilled labor.  
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Figure 4: Implications of international value-added linkages for measured TFP 
 
Source: Cuñat – Zymek (2017b). 
 
4. Impact of education on human capital and migration 
In the environment of the Solow growth model, the contribution of education to TFP can best 
be identified by extending the Cobb-Douglas production function to include “human 
capital” as an additional explanatory variable. 4 Mankiw et al. (1992) introduced this 
“augmented Solow model” which says “that differences in tax policies, education policies, 
tastes for children, and political stability will end up among the ultimate determinants of cross-
country differences” in income per capita (p.433). However, variables taken to be exogenous 
in this model vary much from country to country. 
In empirical models, the human capital variable can be approximated by data for the 
quantity and quality of schooling, but also by information on the health status of the labor 
force (Caselli 2005). Earlier DA studies have come to the conclusion that differences in the 
quantity of schooling contribute only a relatively small fraction to the output gap between 
developing and rich countries. Thus, most of the human capital effect would accrue to the 
quality of schooling which obviously differs from country to country (e.g. Erosa et al. 2010).  
Using data on the development of the educational attainment of the population aged 15 
and above, Barro – Lee (2010) found that in the world as a whole the average time of 
schooling increased from 3.2 years in 1950 to 7.8 years in 2010. For the developing world, the 
respective figures are 2.1 and 7.1 years, for advanced countries 6.2 and 11.0 years. Although 
                                                          
4  The resulting function in log-form would be: lnY = lnA + lnK + ßlnH + (1--ß)lnL, where H is the stock of 
human capital. 
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developing countries have dramatically increased educational attainment, they are still far 
behind the high-income economies, just reaching their level of the 1960s (Figure 5). Parallel to 
these achievements, the illiteracy rates in developing countries have successfully been 
reduced, from 64.9% in 1950 to 20.1% in 2010. For younger persons aged 15-24 years, the 
decline was even more dramatic, from 47.1% to 7.1%. 
 
Figure 5: Average years of schooling, by educational level: Total population over age 15 
 
Note: Note: Advanced countries = Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USA, United Kingdom. 
Source: Barro – Lee (2010). 
 
Barro – Lee also investigated the relationship between education and income, relating the 
cross-country differences in output per worker to the differences in schooling years. The results 
of regression estimates suggest that ceteris paribus the output of the world economy would 
increase by some 2% for every additional years of schooling. Montenegro – Patrinos (2014) 
estimate the private returns to another year of schooling which are 9.7% for the global 
average (at 10.4 years of schooling), 12.4% for Sub-Saharan Africa (at 8 years of schooling), 
and 7.4% for Europe and Central Asia (at 12.4 years of schooling). 
According to Schwartz (1976), migrants on average move from lower-income regions to 
higher-income regions, and migration flows (controlling for population base) increase with 
education and diminish with age and the distance to overcome. He also showed that the 
ratio of net to gross migration declines with education (Schwartz 1971). 
Education may exert different, partly opposing, effects on migration. Following Fargues 
(2017), there is a complex two-way relationship between education and migration with 
consequences on both migrants and non-migrants in the origin as well as the destination 
countries (Table 3): 
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 The causal impact of education on migration in the country of origin becomes visible 
when people acquire sufficient skills and mobility to grasp the possibilities of changing 
their residence. For the immobile population left behind, the result could be an 
undesirable brain drain. In the country of destination, native workers tend to see 
immigrants as competitors for good jobs, pushing migrants often aside to inferior 
occupations resulting in brain waste.  
 An opposite impact of migration on education may be felt in the country of origin 
resulting from new economic contacts with more advanced countries, from emigrants 
returning back home, and from emigrants’ remittances, which help improve the living 
conditions including better education for family members (brain gain). 
 
Table 3: The web of mutual causation between education and migration 
Concerned population Education   Migration Migration   Education 
Origin 
country 
Migrants Education, a driver of 
migration 
Education gained abroad, then 
brought back home by return 
migrants (“circular migration”) 
Non-
Migrants 
Development consequences 
of highly-educated migration: 
“brain drain” vs. international 
remittances 
Migrant remittances' impact on 
education in the homeland; 
parent’s absence impact on 
education; prospect of emigration, 
an incentive to acquire more 
education (“brain gain”) 
Destination 
country 
Migrants Over-qualification of migrants 
(“brain waste”) 
School performances of migrants’ 
kids; student (and teachers’) 
migration 
Non-
Migrants 
Competition and emulation 
between natives and 
migrants 
Diversity of origins in the classroom 
and the quality of education; enroll-
ment of locals in foreign schools and 
the building of human capital 
Source: Based on Fargues (2017) 
 
Education may thus enhance migration when education contributes to better handling 
adverse situations, favors those who are future-oriented and makes them better informed of 
regional income differences. The other side of the coin could be that education may retard 
migration when it improves the chances for better jobs and incomes at home. In an empirical 
study, Barrientos (2007) found that developing countries benefit from emigration if their 
migration rate is low and if they lack human capital, and countries will lose if the proportion of 
emigrants is too high. 
If circular migration occurs, i.e. former emigrants return to their home country, the skills they 
obtained abroad will contribute to improving the living conditions back home. In the country 
of destination the costs of integration efforts have to be balanced against the advantages of 
diversity and the improved chances of students and teachers exchanges.5 
                                                          
5  The interconnection between education and migration as well as international efforts to enhance 
education of migrants have recently been studied by Wurm – Kohlenberger (2018). The paper 
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The impact of education on emigration from low-income countries is sketched in Figure 6. So 
long as education is at rather low levels (usually when GDP per capita is also rather low), with 
an increase of the education level migration will also tend to rise. The reason is that low but 
increasing education will empower people to read and write, to overcome financial 
constraints, and to widen their comprehension of the world beyond their immediate region of 
origin. Above a certain threshold of GDP per capita (to be determined empirically), further 
increases of education will make it less attractive to move abroad, in particular in industrial 
countries. Barrientos (2007) quotes the empirical analysis by Pedersen – Pytlikova – Smith 
(2006) who found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between education and migration: At a 
high illiteracy rate (measured as share of people above 15 years who cannot read or write a 
short statement) migration is low, mostly confined to shift of location within one and the same 
country (Point 1). As illiteracy diminishes, migration would gradually increase and become 
international (Point 2). Beyond a certain threshold (to be determined empirically), further 
increases in the average education level of the country of origin would by and by diminish 
migration. 
 
Figure 6: Relation between migration and education 
 
Source: Barrientos (2007), based on Pedersen – Pytlikova – Smith (2006). 
 
According to Collier (2013), there is “compelling evidence that migrants tend to be highly 
educated relative to both those left behind and natives of the countries of destination”. 
However, this does not hold any more when young refugees are concerned. In many 
instances they are cut off from access to adequate schooling, most notably in host countries 
that are barely able to educate their native population (Bock-Schappelwein 2018).  
                                                          
includes case studies on origin countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and Austria as a host 
country.  
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From the point of view of the country of origin, migration can be both an advantage and a 
disadvantage. As migrants are rather well-educated, when they leave their home country 
they diminish human capital and cause a reduction of productivity. But they form a sort of 
bridgehead to the host country and are a source of income remittances back home. In case 
of circular migration, enhanced human capital flows back encouraging new business and 
additional educational efforts. In the host country, the immigrants are more likely to be over-
educated than natives, a difference being alleviated over time.6 According to the data 
collected by Docquier – Marfouk (2005), in the years between 1990 and 2000 the share of 
low-skilled migrants declined world-wide from 45% to 36% (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Composition of immigrants in the world by education 
Year Tertiary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Other 
1990 29.8 25.3 44.9 
2000 34.6 29.0 36.4 
Source: Docquier – Marfouk (2005) 
 
Empirical data quoted by Fargues (2017) reveal that international migrants (some 3.5% of 
world population) are not selected randomly. At least when they move voluntarily they are 
overwhelmingly of above-average education, and they are also subject to the immigration 
priorities of the destination countries which, at least for OECD destinations, usually favor 
educated people.  
Empirical analyses for African migrants reveal that Europe is not the dominant target of 
movements, but most people search for a living in another African country. For those leaving 
Africa, relevant destinations besides Europe are the Gulf States and the Americas (see 
Flahaux – de Haas, 2016, and the literature quoted there).  
In their analysis of personal characteristics of migrants from Ukraine, Vakhitova - Coupé (2014) 
conclude that education does not have a clear and persistent effect on most of the 
migration decisions, although there emerges a distinct picture for the period 2005-2008 as 
compared with the period 2010-2012. In the former period, there is no indication that 
education did affect the probability to migrate. People with higher education tended to 
migrate to wealthier countries, but did there accept lower-level jobs. In the latter period, 
semi-educated people tended to migrate more than others, though with no discernable 
preference for destinations. 
In summary, education is one of the most important factors determining living standards and 
economic growth. Therefore, education also impacts strongly on migration, positively in early 
stages of income development (through improved mobility and information about 
alternative living conditions) and negatively in later stages (when living conditions at home 
have improved beyond a certain threshold). There is much evidence that migrants are on 
average better educated than those remaining back home as well as the new workmates in 
the host country. 
                                                          
6  For details, see Tani (2017) and the literature quoted there. 
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5. Impact of migration on countries of origin and destination 
In models of international migration, the countries of origin provide a view from the supply 
side, while the host countries represent factors on the demand side, most importantly the rules 
governing immigration. In general, regular migration is seen to result in gains and costs for 
both the sending and the host countries. Ratha et al. (2011) argue that the collective gains 
from South-North migration would in the long run outperform the income gains from 
comprehensive trade liberalization, one-fifth of which would accrue to the host countries in 
the North. 
Eamets (2013) summarizes the possible impact of migration on the economy of the source 
country: He sees positive effects from increasing mobility, enhancing human capital and 
receiving remittances. Emigration can also help to reduce unemployment and alleviate the 
negative effects of economic restructuring. On the negative side, emigration may result in a 
brain drain which depresses productivity, exacerbates labour shortages and thus put upward 
pressure on wages. Furthermore, emigration could accelerate demographic problems 
(ageing, low birth rate etc.) and enlarge depopulated areas, thereby deepening regional 
discrepancies and amplifying social problems. 
One of the indispensable financial gains in source countries are the remittances of emigrants 
to assist their families back home. The World Bank (2017) projects worldwide remittances in 
2017 at $596 billion, of which $450 billion accrued to low and middle income regions. These 
figures cover just funds sent via formal channels. According to Freund – Spatafora (2005), 
remittances sent through informal channels could add at least 50%, for some countries up to 
250%, to the globally recorded flows. A World Bank study has concluded that a one per cent 
increase in the share of remittances in a country’s GDP leads to a 0.4 per cent decline in 
poverty (Fajnzylber – Lopez 2007). 
Eamets (2013) also provides an overview of the multitude of migration effects on host 
countries. Positive aspects are the stimulus for domestic demand, more choices for consumers 
from an increasing variety of goods and services, and the availability of new talents, although 
immigrants are often pushed into 3D (dirty, dangerous, difficult) jobs which are barely 
accepted by natives. The negative aspects arise primarily from failed integration and the 
resulting social problems, in particular high unemployment among immigrants and the 
agglomeration of slums in big cities. Any gains in short-run competitiveness may induce losses 
in long run, as cheap labor depresses wages also for natives and retards otherwise necessary 
improvements in working conditions.  
Orefice (2011) maintains that the effect of immigration on host countries income is a function 
of the human capital content of immigrants. If immigration impinges negatively upon 
national wages, this is due to the delayed adjustment of physical capital after inflows of 
immigrants. The effects on wages also depend on the assumption about the degree of 
substitutability between immigrants and native workers. The more immigrants are perfect 
substitutes for natives, the more will immigration have adverse effects on host country wages. 
For the USA, Borjas (2003) estimated that immigrant influx between 1980 and 2000 reduced 
wages of average native workers by some 3.2% and wages for high school dropouts by 8.9%. 
For Europe, most studies find that overall reductions in wages are insignificant. This is 
underscored by Kerr – Kerr (2011), who see only “minor displacement effects even after very 
large immigrant flows.” The more visible effects are concentrated on low-educated natives or 
the prior immigrant cohorts, which are the closest substitutes to new immigrant flows. With 
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respect to the fiscal impact of immigration on the host countries, most studies find that net 
effects are marginal and tend to be rather positive than negative. 
The immediate consequences of (irregular) immigration in host countries are often countered 
by political emergency measures which lack any long-term strategy. Such measures are 
often biased by irrational social sentiment which is based on an ideological interpretation of 
the data (Collier 2013). One of the attempts to curb a steady flow of migrants from poor to 
rich countries has been to increase border controls by the latter. The recent refugee crisis in 
Europe has induced fierce disputes on the effectiveness of such measures in the long run and 
the likely secondary consequences (e.g. of human trafficking). 
Another line of argument has been to reduce the incentives for migration via expanding aid 
and liberalizing trade with the countries of origin (“development instead of migration” 
policies). However, as de Haas (2007) has shown, increasing development assistance will most 
likely induce more offshore migration, at least in the “short run” of some two or three 
decades. “Trade, aid, return migration and remittances are no short-cut ‘solutions’ to 
migration, and sustained immigration seems therefore to be likely”. He is particularly 
concerned with restrictive immigration policies which have “unintended effects by 
stimulating irregular migration, discouraging migrants’ circular mobility and pushing them into 
permanent settlement.” 
 
6. Summary 
Out of the many channels between education and migration, we have attempted an 
overview by selecting a few links that are dominant in the literature. The background is 
provided by a discussion of the origins of mass migration waves which are the consequence 
of either political turmoil or inadequate living conditions. The dominant migration flows have 
traditionally been within (large) countries, but more and more also occur across borders. A 
series of push factors drive people out of their previous homes and pull factors allure them to 
places perceived as improving their social and economic environment. Apart from issues of 
personal security, the prospect of improving the living conditions for one’s family now and for 
future generations is the main driving force of emigration from low-income countries. 
Empirical evidence shows that the relationship between income per head and emigration is 
positive for the lower end of the income distribution. Beyond a certain threshold, however, 
more income retards emigration as the gap to the possible living conditions abroad becomes 
blurred. As a result, the emigration-income relationship displays the shape of an inverted U. 
To establish a link with education, one may rely on the findings of Development Accounting, 
an instrument to separate the contribution of human capital to overall income growth. 
Empirical models usually approximate human capital by a combination of the extent and 
quality of schooling, with the larger weight on the quality. Depending on the specifics of the 
production function and the proxy for human capital used, the estimated contribution can 
vary substantially, but has recently been assessed by Malmberg (2017) at some 65%.  
In this context, education plays an important role in getting people to move and to enable 
their integration into a new society. Since income per capita is generally a positive function of 
education, the relation between education and migration is just a mirror image of the 
positive and inverted-U shaped connection between income and migration. In another 
empirical strain it has been established that people who migrate are on average better 
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educated than non-migrants in the source country as well as in the receiving country, 
resulting in a brain drain in the former country and possibly a brain waste in the latter country. 
Migrants are on average inclined to send sizeable remittances back home which thwart any 
negative labour market effect of a brain drain. Receiving countries of migrants and refugees, 
in particular those fleeing drought and civil war are often reluctant to grant refugees the 
basic human rights of asylum and protection against forced return.  
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